Job Market Paper
Can a firm choosing between two agents gain from judging them with error? I show that she can when the agents design the information she receives. Noiseless judging makes even a narrow lead decisive, so agents conceal bad news not to lose; noise makes a narrow lead worth little, so revealing pays more. For a broad class of noise and binary types, the equilibrium is unique: each agent sometimes admits being bad and otherwise pools, and if agents are likely enough to be good, both reveal fully, delivering the first best, unlike under noiseless judging. Moderate noise is best: it curbs concealment without reversing the ranking of posteriors, and the right amount beats noiseless judging at every prior. With a continuum of types, the case for noise survives: under regularity conditions, the firm prefers to judge with error unless the prior density is nondecreasing, and if it is nonincreasing, her best rule tosses a coin only among low posterior means.
Publications
Abstract
Consider a company that owns two sports TV channels: a popular free-to-air channel and a narrow-profile pay one. The company bought the broadcasting rights for a round-robin championship. When developing the broadcasting strategy, the company’s management faces the trade-off between inducing viewers to subscribe to the pay-TV channel and getting revenues from advertisements on the free-to-air channel. Motivated by an anecdotal case of a significant drop in the percentage of broadcasts of best teams among all broadcasts on a free-to-air channel, we propose a theoretical model of broadcasting the championship. We demonstrate that a wide range of strategies can be optimal depending on the market parameters. Whereas the intermediate strategy of broadcasting just weak matches (instead of broadcasting top matches or broadcasting nothing) on the free-to-air channel seems puzzling, we show formally that it can be fully rational for some market configurations. Therefore, we rationalize the puzzling strategy used by the company’s management in the motivational example.
Working Papers
Abstract
How do linkages between markets affect the way producers competing in supply schedules use dispersed information about their costs? On their own, both the demand and the cost linkage let the error in one market's public information distort output in the other, and raise welfare losses. A demand linkage acts only through prices: it raises the efficient weight on private information about the own cost, toward the market's excessive weight, and lowers the share of the value of cost information that is lost. A cost linkage also acts through marginal costs: it lowers this efficient weight and raises this share. The two effects cancel when demand and cost parameters are proportional: what matters is the misalignment of the two linkages, not their strength. In symmetric markets, correlated public information moves the response to the other market against both structural linkages and can offset either of them. When firms learn from prices, the demand and the cost linkage also change what the prices reveal and make them correlated public signals. The efficient welfare loss still falls as information becomes more precise, but the weights on private information about the own cost can move in either direction as either linkage strengthens.
Abstract
Can adding an expert to a panel make a decision-maker worse off, even though the expert can only reveal information? I study a persuasion game in which a decision-maker consults a panel of experts who have state-independent agendas, may be uninformed, and can only disclose or conceal verifiable evidence. A new expert reveals some states that were concealed, but he also shifts the decision-maker's default action, the action she takes when no expert reports, and the other experts adjust what they reveal. I show that a panel of sufficiently extreme experts is stable: no additional expert, whatever his agenda and quality, makes the decision-maker worse off. A panel of moderate experts is generically unstable: for every quality level, some expert close to the default action shifts it so that an incumbent stops revealing states far from it. With commitment to the default action every panel is stable, and extreme panels behave as if the decision-maker could commit. Polarized committees can therefore be expanded safely, while adding a centrist to a moderate committee can backfire.
Research in Progress
- Bayesian Persuasion in an Entry Deterrence Model
- Pricing and Information Disclosure with Consumer Search