IGOR KARPOV

ikarpov@uchicago.edu – karpov-igor.github.io – (312) 918-4313

Placement Director:	Manasi Deshpande	mdeshpande@uchicago.edu	(773) 702-8260
Graduate Administrator:	Kathryn Falzareno	kfalzareno@uchicago.edu	(773) 702-3026

Office Contact Information

University of Chicago, Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics
Saieh Hall for Economics
5757 S University Ave
Chicago, IL 60637

Education

University of Chicago, Ph.D. Economics *2020–2027 (expected)*

New Economic School, Visiting Researcher (on leave from UChicago) *2025–2026*

New Economic School, B.A. Economics, ranked 1st of 59 *2016–2020*

Tilburg University, Exchange Semester *Spring 2019*

University of Warwick, Summer School *2018*

University of British Columbia, Summer School *2017*

References

Professor Benjamin Brooks (Chair)
University of Chicago
Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics
babrooks@uchicago.edu

Professor Doron Ravid
University of Michigan
Department of Economics
doronr@umich.edu

Professor Emir Kamenica
University of Chicago
Booth School of Business
emir.kamenica@chicagobooth.edu

Professor Joseph Root
University of Chicago
Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics
jroot@uchicago.edu

Research and Teaching Fields

Primary: Microeconomic Theory
Secondary: Sports Economics

Job Market Paper

Competitive Persuasion with a Noisy Judge

Abstract: *Can a firm choosing between two agents gain from judging them with error? I show that she can when the agents design the information she receives. Noiseless judging makes even a narrow lead decisive, so agents conceal bad news not to lose; noise makes a narrow lead worth little, so revealing pays more. For a broad class of noise and binary types, the equilibrium is unique: each agent sometimes admits being bad and otherwise pools, and if agents are likely good, both reveal fully, delivering the first best, unlike under noiseless judging. Moderate noise is best: it curbs concealment without reversing the ranking of posteriors, often beating a noiseless rule. With a continuum of types, the case for noise*

survives: under regularity conditions, the firm prefers to judge with error unless the prior density is nondecreasing, and if it is nonincreasing, her best rule tosses a coin only among low posterior means.

Publications

Strategic Broadcasting of a Championship: Slicing the Matches Between TV Channels (with Dmitry Dagaev), *International Journal of Sport Finance*, 2026, 21(2), 101–115

Abstract: *Consider a company that owns two sports TV channels: a popular free-to-air channel and a narrow-profile pay one. The company bought the broadcasting rights for a round-robin championship. When developing the broadcasting strategy, the company's management faces the trade-off between inducing viewers to subscribe to the pay-TV channel and getting revenues from advertisements on the free-to-air channel. Motivated by an anecdotal case of a significant drop in the percentage of broadcasts of best teams among all broadcasts on a free-to-air channel, we propose a theoretical model of broadcasting the championship. We demonstrate that a wide range of strategies can be optimal depending on the market parameters. Whereas the intermediate strategy of broadcasting just weak matches (instead of broadcasting top matches or broadcasting nothing) on the free-to-air channel seems puzzling, we show formally that it can be fully rational for some market configurations. Therefore, we rationalize the puzzling strategy used by the company's management in the motivational example.*

Working Papers

Demand, Cost and Information Linkages in Markets with Decentralized Information

Abstract: *How do linkages between markets affect the way producers competing in supply schedules use dispersed information about their costs? On their own, both the demand and the cost linkage let the error in one market's public information distort output in the other, and raise welfare losses. A demand linkage acts only through prices: it raises the efficient weight on private information about the own cost, toward the market's excessive weight, and lowers the share of the value of cost information that is lost. A cost linkage also acts through marginal costs: it lowers this efficient weight and raises this share. The two effects cancel when demand and cost parameters are proportional: what matters is the misalignment of the two linkages, not their strength. In symmetric markets, correlated public information moves the response to the other market against both structural linkages and can offset either of them. When firms learn from prices, the demand and the cost linkage also change what the prices reveal and make them correlated public signals. The efficient welfare loss still falls as information becomes more precise, but the weights on private information about the own cost can move in either direction as either linkage strengthens.*

The Stability of Expert Panels in Persuasion Games (undergraduate thesis)

Abstract: *Can adding an expert to a panel make a decision-maker worse off, even though the expert can only reveal information? I study a persuasion game in which a decision-maker consults a panel of experts who have state-independent agendas, may be uninformed, and can only disclose or conceal verifiable evidence. A new expert reveals some states that were concealed, but he also shifts the decision-maker's default action, the action she takes when no expert reports, and the other experts adjust what they reveal. I show that a panel of sufficiently extreme experts is stable: no additional expert, whatever his agenda and quality, makes the decision-maker worse off. A panel of moderate experts is generically unstable: for every quality level, some expert close to the default action shifts it so that an incumbent stops revealing states far from it. With commitment to the default action every panel is stable, and extreme panels behave as if the decision-maker could commit. Polarized committees can therefore be expanded safely, while adding a centrist to a moderate committee can backfire.*

Research in Progress

Bayesian Persuasion in an Entry Deterrence Model
Pricing and Information Disclosure with Consumer Search

Fellowships and Awards

Theodore W. Schultz Economics Fellowship	*2026–2027*
University of Chicago Social Sciences Division Fellowship	*2020–2025*
Prize winner, All-Russian Olympiad in Economics (2nd and 4th of about 260 finalists)	*2015, 2016*
Winner, Vysshaya Proba Olympiad in Economics (1st and 2nd place)	*2015, 2016*

Teaching Experience

New Economic School	
Microeconomics 1 (undergraduate), TA for Prof. Dmitry Dagaev	*Spring 2026*
Microeconomics 2 (undergraduate), TA for Prof. Tatiana Mayskaya	*Fall 2025*
University of Chicago	
Elements of Economic Analysis I (undergraduate), TA for Prof. Pablo Peña	*Spring 2023*
Price Theory II (graduate), TA for Prof. Philip Reny	*Winter 2023*
Advanced Game Theory (undergraduate), TA for Prof. Joseph Root	*Fall 2021, Fall 2022*
Honors Econometrics (undergraduate), TA for Prof. Joseph Hardwick	*Spring 2022*
High school and olympiad teaching	
Olympiad training schools, instructor (microeconomics, calculus, game theory)	*2016–present*
Basic Calculus, part-time teacher, School 57, Moscow	*2018–2021*

Research Experience and Other Employment

Research Assistant for Prof. Shahir Safi, New Economic School	*2025*
Research Assistant for Prof. Benjamin Brooks, University of Chicago	*2022*
Research Assistant for Prof. Emir Kamenica, University of Chicago	*2022*
Research Assistant for Prof. Joseph Root, University of Chicago	*2022*
Research Assistant for Profs. Azeem Shaikh and Max Tabord-Meehan, University of Chicago	*2022*
Research Assistant for Prof. Dmitry Dagaev, Higher School of Economics	*2018–2021*

Presentations

NES Brown Bag Seminar	*2025*
University of Chicago student workshop	*2022–2027*

Service

Reviewer (opponent) for B.A. theses in Economics, New Economic School	*2024*
Problem committee, Vysshaya Proba Olympiad in Economics	*2022–2024*
Jury member, All-Russian Olympiad in Economics	*2021*

Additional Information

Programming Skills	Python, Julia, Gurobi, R
Languages	Russian (Native), English (Proficient), German (B1)